Black Box Machine Learning models leak information about the proprietary model parameters and architecture, both through side channels and output predictions. An adversary can thus, exploit this leakage to reconstruct a substitute architecture similar to the target model, violating the model privacy and Intellectual Property. However, all such attacks, infer a subset of the target model attributes and identifying the rest of the architecture and parameters (optimally) is a search problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Neural Networks undergo an iterative design and development process to achieve state of the art performance on a human level complex task like speech or object recognition, tracking and identification. Companies invest significant human resource and capital to design these neural networks making them an important Intellectual Property. For instance, Amazon, Google, BigML and Microsoft have adopted the business paradigm of Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS). These models are provided as a commercial service to the customers on a pay-per-query basis, making these black box models of significant commercial value to motivated adversaries.
Extracting the knowledge (both architecture and parameters) present in these Machine Learning models enables an adversary to mount various other security and privacy attacks. For instance, given the approximate architecture of the target model, an adversary can generate effective transferable adversarial examples against black box models [28] , mount membership privacy attacks to identify whether a data point was part of the training data or not [31] [30] and extract the inputs passed to the model [36] [11] [15] . This makes the theoretical study of model extraction important for designing effective defences. Further, a theoretical analysis provides the relative risks of different attack types against black box models.
In order to successfully mount a model extraction attack, the adversary's goal is to extract the knowledge, which includes both the hyperparameters (architecture) and the weights or parameters (functionality) of the target model. In a black box setting, such as MLaaS, the adversary can only query the target model through an API and get the corresponding output predictions. Here, machine learning based models can be trained to infer the target model attributes based on the input-output pairs [26] or iteratively solving the equations for unknown parameter variables to extract the functionality. However, under the stronger assumption where the adversary has access to the hardware executing the model, side channel leakage such as power consumption [4] , timing channels [10] and cache side channels [38] [16] can be exploited. The question that we aim to address in this work is,
How much knowledge about the target model can an adversary infer from model extraction attacks? In other words, How much information does a machine learning model leak under different model extraction attacks? Each of the previously proposed model extraction can infer only a subset of the total attributes of the target model. Further, for machine learning based attacks, there is an inherent uncertainty (noise) in making predictions about the target model attributes [24] . This makes estimating the target model architecture and parameters uncertain. Despite (hypothetically) knowing the exact black box architecture, the training process to steal the model functionality (parameters) such as knowledge distillation and active learning [14] , are inherently stochastic due to which the substitute model performance is not exactly the same as the target model [19] . Hence, in order to quantify the knowledge extracted by the adversary or information leaked by the model through various model extraction attack, it is important to mathematically capture these uncertainties.
Contributions. We propose a probabilistic framework, AIRAVATA, to quantify the information leakage about the model parameters and architecture by capturing the uncertainty in extracting model attributes using model extraction attacks. In order to mathematically model uncertainties in different variables, we use probabilistic graphical models [13] . In this paper, we focus on Bayesian Networks which capture the uncertainties in variables using probability distributions and encode the relation between different variables in a Directed Acyclic Graph. AIRAVATA combines various model extraction attacks considered as variables of the Bayesian Network which allows to estimate the total extracted knowledge (or information leaked) from the target model. This specifically helps to analyse different possible combinations of attacks and reason about their effectiveness in extracting the model. In a game between an attacker and defender, this analysis is of significant importance for identifying the optimal combination of attacks to maximise target model leakage, and accordingly set up defences.
Frequentist view of probability to model uncertainty requires large amount of data. Instead, we use subjective notion of probability where we measure probability as the belief of occurrence of a particular event. On performing different attacks, the adversary obtains incomplete knowledge about the target model. Hence, considering the collective opinion of multiple attack vectors helps to iteratively move from black box (incomplete knowledge) to white box (complete knowledge). We experimentally validate our model by implementing a Bayesian Network to fit the data capturing relation between different attacks and corresponding inferred attributes. In this paper, we focus on Neural Networks due to its huge parameter space, but can be extended to other black box algorithms including cryptographic protocols.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Machine Learning
Given the space of data instances X and space of corresponding ground truth labels Y , the goal of Machine Learning algorithms is to learn a classification function f : X −→ Y that accurately maps the data samples in X to its corresponding class in Y . This is modelled as an optimisation problem where the parameters are computed by minimising the loss function l(f (x), y) over each data instance (x, y) by capturing the difference in model's prediction f (x) and the ground truth label y. Instead of performing the optimisation on the entire data population P (X, Y ), we estimate the loss (L D ) over the
However, machine learning models tend to overfit on the training data, i.e, the accuracy on the training data is much higher than the accuracy on evaluation (previously unseen) data [5] . To ensure that the model does not overfit, a regularisation function (J) is added to the loss function making the final optimisation as,
Deep Learning. Deep Neural Networks are a class of machine learning algorithms comprising of multiple computational units, called nodes (neurones), arranged in layers which are stacked sequentially. Each node performs matrixvector multiplication between the updated parameter matrix and corresponding input activation from the previous layer. This computation is followed by an activation function which restricts the output from growing too large.
The architecture details (hyperparameters) of the Neural Networks play a significant role in determining the performance. Learning Rate (α) determines scales the loss gradient and controls the extent of weight updates during training of the network, θ ← θ − α ∂J(θ) ∂θ where J(θ) is the loss computed between the predicted values and the ground truth labels. Weight Decay (λ) parameter controls the balance between regularisation and the loss function (shown in Equation 1 ). The number of layers in the Network (depth) and the total number of nodes in each layers are important hyperparameters which determine the overall learning capacity of the model. There are different types of activation functions that can be used to restrict the matrix vector computation performed by each node like ReLU , Sigmoid or T anh to a fixed range of output values. Further, in case of Convolutional Neural Networks, the type of layers like convolutional, maxpool or fully connected layer play an important role in determining the model complexity. Finally, the choice of loss functions like cross-entropy, mean-squared error along with the optimisation technique used like ADAM, SGD and RMSprop determine the final performance of the Neural Network architecture. After training the entire neural network, keeping the above architectural details fixed, the final parameters or weights after updates determine the performance of the model.
To reconstruct or steal the functionality of a target neural network, an adversary is required to extract (a) the architectural attributes or hyperaparameters and (b) the final updated parameters after training. The large number of attributes of the target model make model extraction attacks complex and challenging.
B. Probabilistic Graphical Models
Complex systems are characterised by multiple inter-related attributes which are considered as random variables to capture various uncertainties in the system. The goal is to reason about the hypothesis variable based on some prior observations. The entire system can be modelled using the joint probability distribution over the set of random variables X but computing the entire distribution is computationally expensive, especially, for high dimensional networks with large number of variables. For instance, assuming that each of the N random variables in set X is binary, the total number of possibilities is 2 N . Alternatively, Probabilistic Graphical Models encode the complex joint probability distribution over a high dimensional space compactly using a graphical structure [21] [13] . The nodes in the graphs represent the random variables characterising the complex system while the (lack of) edges between the nodes represent the conditional dependence or independence assumptions. Since, in our attack modelling, there exists a cause-effect relationship between the attacks and the inferred model attributes, we use directed acyclic graphical models, specifically, Bayesian Belief Networks. These networks establish causality between different random variables on a solid mathematical foundation [29] . DEFINITION 1. A Bayesian Network is a Directed Acyclic Graph G = (V, E) with a random variable x i ∀ i ∈ V characterised by a conditional probability distribution p(x i |p A (x i )) per node specifying the probability of x i conditioned on all the parent nodes p A . The joint probability distribution p(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) can be written as,
Using the chain rule, we can expand it as the product of f actors,
Networks are a natural choice to model problems with uncertainty and causal relation between the variables. Firstly, Bayesian Networks can learn from sparse and incomplete datasets by probabilistically encoding dependencies between variables. Secondly, the networks encode the causal relationship to help reason and infer about the prior knowledge. Further, Bayesian Networks provide declarative representation by encoding the system details while enabling algorithms to infer and reason about the knowledge captured in the models.
Structure Representation. Structure learning algorithms search the structure of the graphical network and identify the dependencies of different variables on each other given the data. This is typically done by defining a score function, for instance based on log-likelihood of the data and search among different DAGs for a structure which maximises the score and search for the optimal structure using either a greedy or local search. Alternatively, the constraint based approach defines constraints on the edges of the graph and then finds the optimal graph that fits those constraints. Constraint based approach however, requires significantly higher data compared to score based learning. In this work, however, we build the graph structure based on our subjective knowledge about the domain due to the small number of variables in the proposed models.
Parameter Learning. Given the structure of the graph, the goal is to estimate the factors (conditional probability distribution) corresponding to each of the node which make up the joint probability distribution. In this work, we focus on Bayesian parameter estimation which explicitly models uncertainty over the node variables x i as well as the parameters of the Bayesian network. The parameters θ are considered a random variable which follow a prior distribution p(θ) which encodes our subjective beliefs [23] . This deviates from the frequentist notion of probability which requires to enumerate all possibilities for a given hypothesis which is not possible for complex systems with exponential number of cases and partial observability. For each data point from the dataset, the model updates it prior beliefs using the Bayes' rule,
Here, the prior distribution assumed for the parameters θ is Dirichlet distribution which is iteratively updated based on new data samples, i.e, P (θ) = Dirichlet(θ|α) where α is a set of hyperparameters for the distribution. This is specifically useful to our case of model extraction attacks where the data for training the Bayesian model is limited. Inference. Given a Bayesian Network model which encodes the dependencies between different random variables characterising the system, the goal is to infer the model, i.e, estimate the probabilities of interest. The model should encode all probabilistic information that will permit to calculate all marginal, conditional and joint probabilities. However, computing these probabilities exactly, in some cases is NP hard, and is dependent on the graph structure. In this work, we focus on variable elimination algorithm, an exact inference algorithm. Given the probability distribution across random variables x i , we want to compute the marginal probability of x n by summing across all the other variables, i.e,
Instead of directly computing the above, we utilise the factorisation of joint probability distribution, p(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) given in Equation 3 .
The summation first eliminates the random variables by summing them from x 1 till x n−1 . For each summation, the complexity is about O(k 2 ) where k is the possible values for each random variable. Overall, given n such random variables the complexity is about O(nk 2 ).
Reducing Entropy of Black Box Model. The subjective notion of probability used in Bayesian Networks can be modelled using reduction in entropy [9] . Various attacks performed on the target machine learning model, leaks some attribute of the target model which reduces the overall entropy of the black box model. In other words, we can define reduction in uncertainty due to model extraction attacks as the amount of information that the adversary acquires on performing various attacks on the target model. Let X be a discrete Random Variable denoting the inferred attribute, taking values x 1 , · · · , x n with probability P (X = x i ) = P (x i ). This can be quantified using the Shannon Entropy of the random variable X,
Given some prior evidence, the information influences the probability distribution of the hypthesis variable, i.e, there is a flow of information from the information variables to the hypothesis variables. Given two random variables X and Y , the joint probability H(X, Y ) satisfies the following relationship,
where,
Here, H(X) represents the represents the prior uncertainty while H(X|Y ) represents the updated or posterior uncertainty given the evidence Y . Further, to specifically measure the uncertainty a particular attack reduces about the black box model, we can compute the mutual information I(X; Y ) as,
The Mutual Information captures the uncertainty reduced given Random variable Y with respect to uncertainty in X.
III. MODEL EXTRACTION ATTACKS DEFINITION 2. Given a black box target Neural Network, the goal of the adversary is to search for a substitute model f substitute ∈ S, where S is the search space for all possible models with different hyperparameters, such that the functionality of f target approximates f substitute using minimum possible queries.
The test accuracy given by,
is used to compute the difference between the two models f target and f substitute for inputs (x, y) sampled from the data(D), i.e, (x, y) ∼ D and d is the distance function between the two models. Model extraction attacks can be broadly classified into machine learning based attribute inference and exploiting information from side channel leakage. These attack enable the adversary to infer a subset of attributes to identify and design the model architecture to be close to the target model which reduces the complexity to achieve similar functionality.
For modelling these attacks as part of the Bayesian Framework, we categorise them into different groups based on the common attack approach and the model attributes inferred.
Equation Solving Attacks. Given large number of inputoutput pairs (x, f (x)), a good approximation of function f can be obtained by solving system of equations [34] . Further, we can model a system of equation containing the regularisation hyperparameter from the objective function which is overdetermined, allowing to extract the hyperparameter on solving the equation by solving using least square method to find an approximate solution [35] . Solving large number of equations, however, requires large number of queries to the target model.
ML against ML. Machine Learning models can be trained to predict model attributes from the inputs and corresponding output predictions [26] . Several machine learning models are trained to infer target model attributes from the output predictions. This however, requires significant computation time to train all the machine learning models. Alternatively, a synthetic training dataset for the substitute model can be generated by passing inputs(x) to the target model and using the corresponding predictions(f (x)) as labels instead of the true labels(y) [27] .
Timing Side Channel. For a weak adversary with no knowledge about the target model, it is possible to infer the number of layers by computing the total execution time of the network [10] . The attack is based on the idea that all the nodes in a single layer are computed in parallel while all the layers are computed sequentially due to which the total execution time is strongly correlated to the number of layers. Unlike other attacks, timing attack requires constant number of queries to the black box model and can be performed in a complete black box setting.
Hardware Side Channel Attacks. An adversary with physical access to the hardware can monitor the memory access patterns during the model execution on the hardware (memory side channel) as well as exploit shared resources between processes to extract the process details (cache side channel). Memory side channels reveal the dimensions for the filters for individual layers, type of layer, dimensions of each layer and the connections [18] [33] [17] . Notably, other hardware details like hardware performance counters, cache misses and instruction and data flow can reveal significant internal model details running on these hardware [25] . Alternatively, exploiting shared resources between target model process and an attacker process, an adversary can monitor the number of calls, the size of matrix dimensions to identify the number of layers and hyperparameter details in the Neural Network [16] . Further, cache attacks can distinguish different activation function like relu, sigmoid and tanh by monitoring the probe addresses [38] . Identifying these model attributes drastically reduces the overall search space to find a model close to the target model.
Power Side Channel. During the execution of the neural network on hardware, a strong adversary with physical access to the target hardware, can monitor the power consumed to infer details about the number of parameters in each layers, values of each parameters, total number of layers and the type of activation function [4] . Given the power consumption traces, the attacker uses algorithms like differential power analysis, correlated power analysis and horizontal power analysis to infer the target black box model details [20] .
IV. AIRAVATA FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe our proposed Bayesian Framework and different cause-effect relationships between various attacks and the inferred model attributes. For the structure of the Bayesian Networks, we do not use a structure learning algorithm since the number of nodes are less and the model is simple. Figure 1 shows the proposed Bayesian Network Graph with the attack nodes at the top layer followed by the inferred 
A. Sources of Uncertainty
Uncertainty in model extraction occurs at two levels: (a) while inferring model attributes by performing an attack and (b) using the inferred attributes to reconstruct an approximate architecture using stochastic learning algorithms. While performing the model extraction attack and inferring individual attributes, variability of experimental measurement while using machine learning models to infer target model attributes could result in experimental uncertainty in both side channel based extraction attacks and machine learning based attacks. Further, while training the attack models, there exists parameter uncertainty where the model parameters are optimised and exact values are unknown (stochastic). These inherent uncertainty in machine learning approaches [24] can lead to imprecision in inferring the extracted model attributes. Using the inferred attributes to learn the approximate architecture, cannot give the exact results close to the target model as no single attack can infer the entire model with complete certainty and each attack infers only a subset of the overall model attributes. Hence, uncertainty exists while identifying the exact target model which is unknown for an adversary. Quantifying this uncertainty probabilistically allows to determine the best possible performance of the substitute architecture that the adversary can achieve compared to the target model based on the degree of knowledge that the attacker has inferred.
B. Adversary Models
Adversary models can be classified into Black Box and White Box adversary based on the knowledge about the target model. We consider three adversary models based on the adversary strength and influence which determines whether the attacker has physical access to the hardware running the target model or not.
Adversary 1 (remote) adversary is weak and does not have physical access to the underlying target model hardware. Instead the adversary can query the target model through an API interface, where given an input image the attacker will receive the corresponding output prediction.
Adversary 2 (side channel) adversary has physical access to the underlying hardware or has relatively strong influence over the target model. For example, the adversary in this case can monitor the memory access patter and measure the side channel information leakage.
Adversary 3 (hypothetical) has both API and physical access and hence can combine and evaluate the attacks done by both Adversary 1 and Adversary 2.
In all the cases, regardless of the strength and influence, the adversary does not have any knowledge about the target model and the goal of the attacker is to infer details about the black box algorithm.
C. Attack Variables
Within our framework, let each of the above attacks be represented by random variables A={A 1 , · · · , A n }. Each of the random variable A i is binary, i.e, it can have only two states: the attack was performed or not performed. Formally, each binary Attack random variable A i ∈ {0, 1} where P (A = A i ) = 1 represents attack was performed while P (A = A i ) = 0 indicates attack was not performed. These are informational random variables the value of which is observable and influences the hypothesis random variable, i.e, the final model knowledge extracted by the attacker. 
D. Inferred Model Attributes
There are some attributes which can be computed using other hyperparameters. We assume each attack infers individual model attributes independently, i.e, all the inferred model attributes are independent of each other and are inferred using during the attack separately.
Each attack reveals certain model attributes. For examples, timing side channel attack reveals the total number of layers in the Neural Network while hardware side channel attack reveals fine grained details about the model like type of activation used, number of layers in the network, parameters (dimensions of individual network) and the different types of layers (convolution, maxpool or fully connected). The degree of knowledge extracted by the two attacks will be drastically different which our proposed model should capture. There exists a cause-effect relationship between the attacks A i ∈ A and the inferred attributes M i ∈ M.
Formally, let each of the model attribute M={M 1 , · · · , M n }. Each of the above random variable takes a discrete value, i.e, if a given attack A i ∈ A does not infer a particular model attribute M j ∈ M then the corresponding value of P (M = M j ) = 0. However, in case, a particular attribute is inferred by a given attack, then the corresponding attribute inferred M j takes value P (M = M j ) = 1.
E. Computing the Degree of the Knowledge Extracted
The ultimate goal is to infer the hypothesis random variable, i.e, the degree of knowledge extracted K. Given the different attributes, the final knowledge acquired is computed based on the number of attributes correctly inferred out of the total attributes. We compute P (K|A) is the probability of the hypothesis random variable K given the evidence of the attack performed(information variables) A. The resultant probability of the hypothesis variable indicates the degree of knowledge about the model inferred by performing model extraction attacks. By evaluating different combination of attacks one can probabilistically infer the model information leakage using on the knowledge acquired.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, our goal is to design and evaluate the Bayesian Network on data generated for model extraction attacks. We implement the Bayesian Network in pgmpy 1 library in python language and design the structure of the Bayesian Network subjectively using expert knowledge as shown in Figure 1 .
A. Dataset
The dataset contains different attacks, corresponding attributes and the overall knowledge inferred. We consider the attack and corresponding attributes inferred to be binary variables, i.e, the attack can either be performed or not ("yes" or "no") based on which the corresponding attributes are inferred. This dataset considers five attack types: Hardware Side Channels (HWSC), Power Side Channel (PowerSC), Machine Learning based attacks (MLvML), Timing Side Channel (TimingSC) and Equation Solving (EqSolve) attack. The total attack combinations are hence, 2 5 and the dataset has all the labels as discrete. In case of the parameters or attributes, since we specifically consider Neural Networks, we have six attributes, namely, Depth of the Network, the learning hyperparameter such as the regularization hyperparameter (λ), number of nodes in each layer, the activation function used, the types of layers (convolution, fully connected, maxpool) and finally the parameter values which determine the functionality of the black box models. Th final knowledge extracted is classified into three categories based on the number of attributes inferred. If all the possible six attributes are inferred based on the attack combination, then the corresponding knowledge extracted about the model is labelled is "High". On the other hand, if the number of attributes inferred is between three to five, then the label is "Medium" and for all attributes less than three the output label for knowledge is "Low". We use the Discrete Bayesian network model to learn from the discrete variable dataset described above.
B. Conditional Independence
The causal relations between different nodes in the Bayesian Network enables one random variable to influence the probability distribution of other random variables. In other words, two random variables X and Y are dependent if observing the value X influences the subjective probability (belief) of Y . It is, hence, important to check for the dependency conditions of the empirical Bayesian model with our subjective understanding.
Following are the cases for independency in the Bayesian Network, we wish to verify in the empirical Bayesian Network model: Common Parent, Cascade and V-Structure. On checking the model independencies, we verified that all the attacks type variables are independent of each other. In other words, for each attack attribute A i ∈ {P owerSC, HW SC, M LvM L, T iming, EqSolve}, we found that A i ⊥ A −i where A −i is all the variables other than A i .
C. Inference: Adversary 1
Given the Bayesian Network model which has captured the uncertainty in model extraction attacks, we want to query the model and reason about different attacks and their effectiveness based on the belief of their success. In the case of Adversary 1, we assume that the adversary is weak and has only remote API access to the target model. In other words, the adversary can send queries (input images) to the target model and get the corresponding output predictions. Here, the adversary can only perform attacks remotely and includes: Timing Side Channel (TimingSC) attacks, Machine Learning based attack (MLvML) and Equation Solving (EqSolve) attack which can be mounted remotely according to their respective threat models. The belief of knowledge extracted for remote black box setting corresponding to Adversary 1 is shown in Table II . In the remote setting, we can reason that since the number of attributes inferred by Timing Side Channel and the Equation Solving attacks are less compared to Machine Learning based attacks (MLvML), the corresponding belief of extracting "Low" knowledge is 0.7681 and 0.7272 respectively. While for strong black box attacks like MLvML, the knowledge extracted has been classified as "Medium" with a belief score of 0.7983.
However, the adversary best benefits from performing the attacks in combination rather than in isolation. Specifically, as shown in Table II , we see that the adversary on combining all the three attacks has a belief score of 0.7354 for "High" degree of knowledge extraction, i.e, correctly infer all the attributes in the network. Interestingly, not performing TimingSC attack results in the same belief. The reason is that since timing attack infers only the depth of the network which is also inferred by MLvML, it des not contribute to any further improvement in the belief.
In summary, in a black box setting, the adversary's best attack combination is MLvML with EqSolve to extract the maximum possible knowledge about the target model correctly.
D. Inference: Adversary 2
In case of Adversary 2, we assume a stronger adversary with physical access to the hardware running the Neural Networks. Here, the adversary can perform hardware based side channel attacks such as cache side channels, memory access patterns and power side channels by monitoring the power consumed by the hardware during the execution of Neural Networks. Here, we see that the improvement in belief in using a combination of Hardware Side Channel and Power Side Channel is not significant compared to performing the attacks independently (Table III) . From this we can reason, that both these attacks (HWSC and PowerSC) are equally strong in terms to extracting knowledge from the target model. However, on combining both the attacks we see that the overall belief for "High" knowledge increases from 0.1024 to 0.1166. However, the PowerSC has a higher belief compared to HWSC and MLvML attack (remote adversary) where "Medium" Knowledge extraction is higher (0.8181 to 0.7983).
E. Inference: Adversary 3
The third setting that we consider as part of our framework is where the adversary has access to both the hardware as well as the remote API to query the model. This hypothetical setting allows to combine attacks from different setting together to estimate the overall belief in extracting the target model knowledge. Table IV , combining different attacks together, results in a maximum belief of 0.7354 for extracting "High" knowledge about target model. However, the same level of knolwedge can be inferred by choosing a careful combination of other attacks. For instance, HWSC + EqSolve and HWSC + PowerSC + EqSolve result in the same belief of extracting the overall knowledge instead of combining all the five attacks.
As shown in
Future Improvements. It is important to note that the belief is estimated based on the attributes inferred by the attacks over the total possible attributes. This estimate is hence same for different attack combinations which provide different approaches to infer the same number of attributes. As part of future work, we intend to further provide weightage to each of the attacks based on metric like accuracy of inferring the attributes and ease of performing attack to further obtain fine grained beliefs for the total target model knowledge extracted.
VI. RELATED WORK
Bayesian Networks have been used extensively to model problems with inherent uncertainty. This has a crucial application in cybersecurity threat detection where the uncertainty of the adversary's actions have to be taken into account [37] [3] [12] . A similar modelling can be done for network security attacks with various threats and exploits can be modelled as random variables in Bayesian Network [22] . Further, identifying data privacy risks by monitoring data access pattern and time duration can provide a tool based on Bayesian Networks to identify data privacy breaches [2] .
Quantifying information leakage by measuring information flow from systems can help to identify and mitigate information leakage. The goal is to identify and quantify leakage from the system about the inputs from the outputs. This is particularly helpful for system designer who objective is to minimise the overall information leakage. Several statistical and information theoretic measures have been proposed to quantify this leakage. The state of the art approaches of quantifying the information leakage rely on frequentist approach by monitoring the frequency of occurrence of input and outputs [7] . However, these mathematical measures are based on white box approaches, i.e, compute the leakage measure from the conditional probabilities of outputs given the inputs [8] [32] [1] . Further, these approaches require large number of input-output data points and this requirement can be lifted by using machine learning models to quantify the leakage [6] . While these measures compute the information leakage of inputs due to the system from corresponding outputs, we focus on modelling the black box systems itself and leakage corresponding to the model parameters and attributes, given the inputs. This line of research is orthogonal to previously proposed work on quantifying input leakage based on inputoutput relationship using information flow.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Model extraction attacks are a major threat to machine learning models which violate the privacy and Intellectual Property of the proprietary machine learning models deployed by companies. For the first time in literature, we propose to unify such attacks under a single theoretical framework based on probabilistic graphical models. This is based on the observation, that no single attack is able to extract the entire model with complete certainty and we can quantify the information leaked (knowledge extracted) by capturing the uncertainty. We focus on Bayesian Networks and experimentally validate our model under different adversary assumptions on a synthetic dataset containing adversary attacks and corresponding model attributes inferred. This analysis allows to estimate the efficiency of model extraction attacks based on the knowledge extracted and hence reason about the optimal combination of attacks that maximises the (model) information leakage. The proposed mathematical framework can be extended to other model black box systems like cryptographic protocols. NOTE ON AIRAVATA: Airavata, in the Indian mythology, is the five-headed white elephant of the hindu god Indra. The framework was named based on our initial discussion which inspired the formulation of the framework. Consider an elephant and multiple blind people whose goal is to identify the animal. Each blind person will be able to identify only certain part of the elephant for instance, the tusk, trunk, tail, ears and so on. In order to identify the animal, all of them have to share their findings, despite which, it is not possible to certainly estimate the animal as an elephant. This is similar to what we see in model extraction attacks where each attack (blind person) wants to identify the black box model (elephant). Due to the uncertainty in the attacks outputs as well as the stochastic training process, it is unlikely that the knowledge of the black box model can be extracted with complete certainty.
